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Reset LSPS5 persistence_in_flight counter on persist errors#4597

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TheBlueMatt merged 1 commit into
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tnull:2026-05-lsps5-persist-counter-leak
May 18, 2026
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Reset LSPS5 persistence_in_flight counter on persist errors#4597
TheBlueMatt merged 1 commit into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
tnull:2026-05-lsps5-persist-counter-leak

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@tnull

@tnull tnull commented May 5, 2026

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LSPS5ServiceHandler::persist incremented persistence_in_flight at the top as a single-runner gate, but only decremented it on the success path: each interior ? on a kv_store future propagated the error out of the function while leaving the counter at >= 1. After one transient I/O failure (disk full, brief unavailability of a remote KVStore, EPERM, etc.) every subsequent persist() call hit the fetch_add > 0 short-circuit and silently returned Ok(false).

The in-memory needs_persist flags then continued to grow without ever reaching disk, so webhook state, removals, and notification cooldowns were lost on the next process restart — including the spec-mandated webhook retention/pruning state — without any error surfaced to the operator. The counter is monotonic, so recovery required a process restart.

Adopt the LSPS1 / LSPS2 pattern: split the body into an inner do_persist and an outer persist that unconditionally clears the counter via store(0) after the call returns, regardless of outcome. A failed write now still propagates Err, but the next persist() attempt actually retries the write instead of no-op'ing.

Co-Authored-By: HAL 9000

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👋 Thanks for assigning @TheBlueMatt as a reviewer!
I'll wait for their review and will help manage the review process.
Once they submit their review, I'll check if a second reviewer would be helpful.

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I've reviewed the full diff, comparing the new LSPS5 persist/do_persist structure against the LSPS1 and LSPS2 reference implementations. Let me trace all paths through the counter logic.

LSPS5 persist() paths:

  1. Early return (fetch_add > 0): counter correctly left for the running thread to manage.
  2. do_persist() returns Err: explicit store(0) before returning — correct.
  3. do_persist() returns Ok, fetch_sub(1) returns 1: counter is now 0, break — correct.
  4. do_persist() returns Ok, fetch_sub(1) returns > 1: store(1), loop again — correct.

All paths correctly reset the counter. The fix is sound.

No issues found.

The code correctly ensures persistence_in_flight is reset to 0 on all exit paths. The structural placement of the loop differs from LSPS1/LSPS2 (loop in persist with store(0) only on error vs. loop in do_persist with unconditional store(0) + debug_assert in persist), but the semantics are equivalent — no counter value can leak. The test properly validates the regression scenario via a FailableKVStore that selectively fails LSPS5 namespace writes.

@ldk-reviews-bot ldk-reviews-bot requested a review from joostjager May 5, 2026 20:25

let res = self.do_persist().await;
debug_assert!(res.is_err() || self.persistence_in_flight.load(Ordering::Acquire) == 0);
self.persistence_in_flight.store(0, Ordering::Release);

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No, this races with a second writer that is started at the same time. We should move the loop out of the inner method and into this method to control the flag entirely in this method.

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Added a fixup.

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Codecov Report

❌ Patch coverage is 46.15385% with 28 lines in your changes missing coverage. Please review.
✅ Project coverage is 86.13%. Comparing base (1a26867) to head (b3544de).
⚠️ Report is 61 commits behind head on main.

Files with missing lines Patch % Lines
lightning-liquidity/src/lsps5/service.rs 46.15% 24 Missing and 4 partials ⚠️
Additional details and impacted files
@@            Coverage Diff             @@
##             main    #4597      +/-   ##
==========================================
- Coverage   86.84%   86.13%   -0.71%     
==========================================
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  Lines      109260   108833     -427     
  Branches   109260   108833     -427     
==========================================
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- Misses      11797    12477     +680     
- Partials     2581     2613      +32     
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@TheBlueMatt TheBlueMatt removed the request for review from joostjager May 6, 2026 01:05
@tnull tnull requested a review from TheBlueMatt May 6, 2026 09:27

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please squash

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`LSPS5ServiceHandler::persist` incremented `persistence_in_flight` at
the top as a single-runner gate, but only decremented it on the
success path: each interior `?` on a `kv_store` future propagated the
error out of the function while leaving the counter at >= 1. After
one transient I/O failure (disk full, brief unavailability of a
remote `KVStore`, EPERM, etc.) every subsequent `persist()` call hit
the `fetch_add > 0` short-circuit and silently returned `Ok(false)`.

The in-memory `needs_persist` flags then continued to grow without
ever reaching disk, so webhook state, removals, and notification
cooldowns were lost on the next process restart — including the
spec-mandated webhook retention/pruning state — without any error
surfaced to the operator. The counter is monotonic, so recovery
required a process restart.

Adopt the LSPS1 / LSPS2 pattern: split the body into an inner
`do_persist` and an outer `persist` that unconditionally clears the
counter via `store(0)` after the call returns, regardless of
outcome. A failed write now still propagates `Err`, but the next
`persist()` attempt actually retries the write instead of no-op'ing.

Co-Authored-By: HAL 9000
@tnull tnull force-pushed the 2026-05-lsps5-persist-counter-leak branch from a23feec to b3544de Compare May 8, 2026 09:15
@tnull

tnull commented May 8, 2026

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please squash

Squashed without further changes.

@TheBlueMatt TheBlueMatt merged commit 39434df into lightningdevkit:main May 18, 2026
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Backported to 0.2 in #4683.

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LSPS5 was not implemented in 0.1 so no need to backport.

TheBlueMatt added a commit to TheBlueMatt/rust-lightning that referenced this pull request Jun 23, 2026
v0.2.3 - Jun 18, 2026 - "Through the Loupe"

API Updates
===========

 * `DefaultMessageRouter` will now always generate blinded message paths that
   provide no privacy (where our node is the introduction node) for nodes with
   public channels. This works around an issue which will appear for any nodes
   with LND peers that enable onion messaging - such peers will refuse to
   forward BOLT 12 messages from unknown third parties, which most BOLT 12
   payers rely on today (lightningdevkit#4647).
 * Explicit `amount_msats` of 0 is rejected in BOLT 12 `Offer`s; `OfferBuilder`
   now maps 0-amounts to an amount of `None` (lightningdevkit#4324).

Bug Fixes
=========

 * `Features::supports_zero_conf` no longer clears the `ZeroConf` features and
   `Features::requires_zero_conf` now correctly reports required, rather than
   supported, status (lightningdevkit#4517).
 * If an MPP payment is claimed but `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s for some parts are
   still being completed asynchronously, further channel updates (e.g.
   forwarding another payment) are pending and the node restarts, the channel
   could have become stuck (lightningdevkit#4520).
 * The presence of unconfirmed transactions actually no longer causes
   `ElectrumSyncClient` to spuriously fail to sync (lightningdevkit#4590).
 * LSPS1, LSPS2, and LSPS5 persistence will no longer get stuck and refuse to
   persist again after a single failure from the KVStore (lightningdevkit#4597, lightningdevkit#4282).
 * Dropping the future returned by
   `OutputSweeper::regenerate_and_broadcast_spend_if_necessary` no longer
   results in future calls to the same method being spuriously ignored (lightningdevkit#4598).
 * Used async-receive offers are no longer refreshed on every timer tick once
   their refresh time is reached (lightningdevkit#4672).
 * `FilesystemStore::list_all_keys` will no longer fail if there are stale
   intermediate files lying around from a previous unclean shutdown (lightningdevkit#4618).
 * When forwarding an HTLC while in a blinded path with proportional fees over
   200%, LDK will no longer spuriously allow a forward that pays us 1 msat too
   little in fees (lightningdevkit#4697).
 * Fixed a rare case where a channel could get stuck on reconnect when using
   both async `ChannelMonitorUpdate` persistence and async signing (lightningdevkit#4684).
 * If we had exactly zero balance in a zero-fee-commitment channel, the
   counterparty was able to splice all of their balance out, violating the
   reserve requirements they'd otherwise be forced to keep (lightningdevkit#4580).
 * Providing an `Event::HTLCIntercepted` to the `LSPS2ServiceHandler` twice no
   longer results in spuriously opening a channel early (lightningdevkit#4656).
 * `Event::PaymentSent::fee_paid_msat` is no longer `None` in cases where
   `ChannelManager::abandon_payment` was called before the payment ultimately
   completes anyway (lightningdevkit#4651).
 * `AnchorDescriptor::previous_utxo` now provides the correct `script_pubkey`
   for non-zero-commitment-fee anchor channels (lightningdevkit#4669).
 * Syncing a `ChainMonitor` using the `Confirm` trait will no longer write some
   full `ChannelMonitor`s to disk several times per block (lightningdevkit#4544).
 * `OMDomainResolver` now correctly accounts for failed queries when rate
   limiting, ensuring we continue to respond to queries after failures (lightningdevkit#4591).
 * Calling `ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route` without a `route_params`
   and with an invalid `Route` will no longer panic (lightningdevkit#4707).
 * `LSPS2ServiceHandler::channel_open_failed` now correctly fails intercepted
   HTLCs rather than allowing them to fail just before expiry (lightningdevkit#4677).
 * `StaticInvoice::is_offer_expired` was corrected to check offer, rather than
   static invoice, expiry (lightningdevkit#4594).
 * `lightning-custom-message`'s handling of `peer_connected` events now ensures
   that sub-handlers will see a `peer_disconnected` event if a different
   sub-handler refused the connection by `Err`ing `peer_connected` (lightningdevkit#4595).
 * Replay protection for LSPS5 signatures now detects replays which are only
   different in the encoded signature's case (lightningdevkit#4701).
 * When `lightning-liquidity` is configured in the background processor, there
   is no longer a stream of `Persisting LiquidityManager...` log spam (lightningdevkit#4246).
 * Incomplete MPP keysend payments will no longer see their HTLCs held until
   expiry (lightningdevkit#4558).
 * `InvoiceRequestBuilder` will no longer accept a `quantity` of `0` for a
   BOLT 12 `Offer`, allowing any quantity up to a bound (lightningdevkit#4667).
 * `lightning-custom-message` handlers that return `Ok(None)` when asked to
   deserialize a message in their defined range no longer cause panics (lightningdevkit#4709).
 * Several spurious debug assertions were fixed (lightningdevkit#4537, lightningdevkit#4618, lightningdevkit#4026)

Security
========

0.2.3 fixes several underestimates of the anchor reserves required to ensure we
can reliably close channels, several denial-of-service vulnerabilities and a
sanitization issue.
 * `Bolt11Invoice::recover_payee_pub_key` no longer panics if called on an
   invoice which set an explicit public key, rather than relying on public key
   recovery. Note that this method is called from
   `PaymentParameters::from_bolt11_invoice` (lightningdevkit#4717).
 * Maliciously-crafted unpayable invoices which have overflowing feerates will
   no longer cause an `unwrap` failure panic (lightningdevkit#4716).
 * Parsing an `LSPSDateTime` which is before 1970 no longer panics. This is
   reachable when parsing messages from counterparties (lightningdevkit#4715).
 * `possiblyrandom` did not properly generate random data except when it was
   explicitly configured to. By default this means LDK is vulnerable to various
   HashDoS attacks (lightningdevkit#4719).
 * `OMNameResolver` will no longer panic when looking up payment instructions
   which include unicode characters at the start of a TXT record (lightningdevkit#4718).
 * When using the `anchor_channel_reserves` module to calculate reserves
   required to pay for fees when closing anchor channels, zero-fee-commitment
   channels were not considered. This could allow a counterparty to open many
   channels, leaving us unable to properly force-close (lightningdevkit#4592).
 * The `anchor_channel_reserves` module overestimated the value of `Utxo`s in
   the wallet by ignoring the `TxIn` cost to spend them (lightningdevkit#4670).
 * `PrintableString` did not properly sanitize unicode format characters,
   allowing an attacker to corrupt the rendering of logs or UI (lightningdevkit#4593, lightningdevkit#4605).
 * RGS data is now limited in how large of a graph it is able to cause a client
   to store in memory. Note that RGS data is still considered a DoS vector in
   general and you should only use semi-trusted RGS data (lightningdevkit#4713).
 * Counterparty-provided strings in failure messages are no longer logged in
   full, reducing the ability of such a counterparty to spam our logs (lightningdevkit#4714).
 * Reading a corrupted `ChannelManager` or `ProbabilisticScorer` can no longer
   cause us to allocate large amounts of memory (lightningdevkit#4712).

Thanks to Project Loupe for reporting most of the issues fixed in this release.

Conflicts resolved in:
 * lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
 * lightning/src/events/mod.rs
 * lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
 * lightning/src/ln/mod.rs
 * lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs
 * lightning/src/ln/onion_utils.rs
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4 participants