This gives guidance about which branches are supported with patches to security vulnerabilities.
| Version / branch | Supported |
|---|---|
| main | ✅ 🚧 ALL fixes immediately, but this is a branch under development with a frequently unstable ABI and occasionally unstable API. |
| 1.15.x | ✅ All fixes that can be backported without breaking ABI compatibility. New tagged releases monthly. |
| 1.14.x | |
| <= 1.13.x | ❌ No longer receiving patches of any kind. |
If you think you've found a potential vulnerability in OSL, please report it to the maintainers. Include detailed steps to reproduce the issue, and any other information that could aid an investigation.
The best way to report a vulnerability is to file a GitHub security advisory. If that is not possible, it is also fine to email your report to security@openshadinglanguage.org. Only the project administrators have access to these reports.
Our policy is to respond to vulnerability reports within 14 days, and to address critical security vulnerabilities rapidly and post patches as quickly as possible.
We only consider a situation to be a security vulnerability if an untrusted party can plausibly trigger the flaw through normal product inputs (for example, a maliciously crafted oso file that might compromise a renderer when loaded). We do not support requesting a CVE for API-only or caller-controlled failures with no realistic adversarial path.
The OSL project adopts the same security stance as many other language compilers: we believe that shaders that will be JITed and executed are by definition trusted inputs, and should not be accepted from untrusted sources. A shader that causes damage when it faithfully executes is not a vulnerability per se. In rare circumstances, we might consider it a vulnerability if a maliciously crafted shader can cause the renderer or OSL library to do something damaging that is different from what the shader text implies.
Flaws whose root cause lies in a dependency should be reported and fixed upstream; the upstream project owns the CVE when one is warranted.
Starting with OSL 1.14.3.0, we cryptographically sign release tags.
To verify a tag, you can use the git tag -v command, which will check
the signature against the public key that is included in the repository.
For example,
git tag -v v1.14.3.0None known
None to date